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ABSTRACT
The aim of this paper is to show the situation of the main European co-operative banking groups (or systems)
through the analysis of particular aspects of their structure and the activities and services they offer, in order to
compare these groups with the Spanish case to check if the different ways of dealing with these aspects agree,
and under what circumstances or how they are developed.
This analysis is also intended to identify the decision-making and economic linking relations set up between cre-
dit co-operatives and the centralised services structures which work within the co-operative banking groups.  
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CIRIEC-ESPAÑA • SPECIAL ISSUE • No. 62/2008 (pp. 87-119)Grupos de banca cooperativa en Europa. Análisis
comparativo de su estructura y actividad      
RESUMEN: El objetivo de este trabajo es conocer la situación de los principales sistemas o grupos de banca
cooperativa mediante el análisis de determinados aspectos de su estructura y de las actividades y servicios
que ofrecen. El objetivo es compararlos con el caso español para poder apreciar los aspectos comunes o dife-
rentes que los caracterizan bajo las diversas circunstancias.
Este análisis trata también de identificar el sistema de toma de decisiones y las relaciones económicas y
estructurales existentes entre las cooperativas de crédito de base y las estructuras centralizadas que operan en
el seno de los grupos de banca cooperativa.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Cooperativas de crédito, banca cooperativa, cajas rurales, grupos de banca
cooperativa.
Groupes bancaires coopératifs en Europe :
analyse comparative des structures et des
activités    
RÉSUMÉ: L’objectif de cet article est de montrer la situation des principaux groupes (ou systèmes) bancai-
res coopératifs européens à travers l’analyse d’aspects particuliers de leurs structures, de leurs activités et des
services qu’ils offrent, afin de comparer ces groupes avec le cas espagnol, pour déterminer les aspects communs
ou différents qui caractérisent les systèmes coopératifs bancaires dans diverses circonstances.
Cette analyse prétend également identifier les systèmes de prise de décisions et les relations économiques
et structurelles existantes entre les coopératives de crédit de base et les structures centralisées qui opèrent au
sein des groupes coopératifs bancaires.
MOTS CLÉ: Coopératives de crédit, banque coopérative, groupes bancaires coopératifs.
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Co-operative banks are quite powerful in many countries in the World, especially in Western Europe,
in Northern America, and even in Far East countries, such as Japan. In fact, in some of these coun-
tries they have, or share, a leading role together with other financial institutions. (Cöté and Vezina,
1998).
The name of co-operative banking can be understood as a term which identifies, in a broad sense,
two different legal forms: on the one hand, credit co-operative societies; and, on the other hand, finan-
cial institutions and specialised service institutions, which are linked to the first ones, but without a
co-operative form (Palomo, 1995). In the same way, credit co-operative societies, also known as co-
operative savings banks or co-operative credit savings banks, have other more precise names in Spain,
according to their different specialisation. These names are: cajas rurales, cajas populares and cajas
profesionales.
As for the method used to collect all the information presented in this paper, it was based, mainly,
in a broad questionnaire carried out among the managers of the main co-operative banking groups in
certain European countries (Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Italy). Furthermore, in some cases,
this information has been completed with personal interviews. 
In particular, the co-operative banking groups selected and analysed have been: the German
Volksbanken and Raiffeisenbanken Group, the French Crédit Agricole Mutuel Group, the Dutch
Rabobank Group, and the Italian Banche di Credito Cooperativo (known as the Casse Rurali ed
Artigiane until 1995), whose respective market shares are 21, 22, 25 and 8 per cent. In this respect,
in the case of France, the analysis of its four co-operative banking groups would have required a sub-
stantial extension of this paper which would had exceeded its aims. Therefore, it has been decided to
choose the Crédit Agricole Mutuel  group due to its relevant size.
With regard to Spain, an equivalent and compared study of the Spanish group, known as the Grupo
Caja Rural, has been included. This group is presently made up of 77 credit co-operatives which form
the Asociación Española de Cajas Rurales (AECR), which, at the same time, are members of the
employers’ association of this sector, the Unión Nacional de Cooperativas de Crédito (UNACC).
1.- Introduction1
1.- This paper is based on books and papers published by the author, between 1995-2007, mainly the titles: PALOMO, R. (1995): La banca
cooperativa en Europa, Unión Nacional de Cooperativas de Crédito y Asociación Española de Cooperativas de Crédito. Madrid; PALOMO, R.
(1997): “Los grupos financieros cooperativos”, Revista CIRIEC-España, nº 27, diciembre, pp. 35-68; PALOMO, R. (Coor.) (2004): Banca coope-
rativa y economía social en Europa. Unión Nacional de Cooperativas de Crédito, Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales (DG Fomento de la
Economía Social y del Fondo Social Europeo). Madrid.Nowadays, it can be assured that the Spanish cajas rurales make up a co-operative banking group
which is set up as a federate banking pattern whose main features are equivalent to those of other
European groups (Palomo, 1997).
To come to this pattern, the Spanish co-operative credit has gone through a long, and sometimes
tortuous, way since its first antecedents, a century ago (Martínez, 2003). This makes an important dif-
ference with regard to the development, more or less continuous and maintained, of the rest of the
European groups analysed, whose consolidation as such took place several decades ago. 
Thus, after a long stage in which advances and recessions alternated, in the 50s and 60s the
expected take-off of the rural co-operative credit took place, and its existence consolidated. However,
the Spanish banking crisis together with other socio-political factors and a particular economic situa-
tion, led to a series of reorganisations in the sector which caused public intervention and the conse-
quent setting up, in 1984, of the Grupo Asociado Banco de Crédito Agrícola-Cajas Rurales, (Barea,
1987; García de Blás, 1987) which was intended to emulate a public-private mixed pattern inspired by
the French Crédit Agricole Mutuel pattern (Martín, 1988; García, 1989; Cerdá, 1988). But this co-oper-
ative banking pattern with public intervention failed in a few years. In fact, in 1989, most of the provin-
cial cajas rurales broke their links with this group, so creating the present co-operative banking group
around the nowadays known as Asociación Española de Cajas Rurales (AECR).
Therefore, in 1989, a split took place within the Spanish cajas rurales, which progressively atten-
uated until 1996, when they almost achieved a complete re-unification. This has given rise to the def-
inite setting up of a co-operative banking organised group made up of the cajas rurales and a number
of specialised institutions, perfectly capable of facing the relevant challenges that may arise in the near
future as well as in the long run.
This particular group structure which identifies the Spanish co-operative banking pattern, known
as Grupo Caja Rural, is characterised by an specific way of managing and developing its activity. This
activity, to be identified as such, requires the definition and application of certain functioning and work-
ing criteria which lead its behaviour and development patterns. But it is also essential that the mem-
bers which belong to this co-operative banking group know, understand, respect and assume such
criteria as if they were particular ones.
Concretely, the main features of the present Spanish federate banking group which the cajas rurales
have made up can be summarised in the following concepts: decentralisation, subsidiariness, soli-
darity, interco-operation, and territoriality. They all must be understood as a compromise assumed
by the institutions linked to this group; a compromise which takes shape in a number of common guide-
lines unanimously accepted by the association agreement that these institutions must sign. (Palomo
and Carrasco, 2001).
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3.- Doing this we are assuming the Rock and Klinedinst criterion (Rock and Klinedinst 1994).• Decentralisation in this federated banking group can be understood as the respect  for the deci-
sion-making and working capacity of every caja rural, as it precisely corresponds to the prin-
ciple inherent in the spirit of the co-operative formula, which has been established through the
democratic participation of its members in the management of the co-operative societies. 
• Subsidiariness has a double functional sense. In its upward sense, it is intended to meet cer-
tain operative needs which the cajas rurales have through the transfer of services or particu-
lar actions to specialised structures. In this way, these needs are satisfied and fully guaranteed
to be successful, and allow the obtaining of economies of scale. On the other hand, in its down-
ward sense, it must respect the main field of activity of the cajas rurales which make up the
group.
• Solidarity appears in different aspects, but it has its most precise expression in the common
guarantee funds which reinforce the group solvency and which, due to their private charac-
ter, may operate with a higher opportunity and flexibility than public funds.
• Interco-operation is a classical principle of co-operatives, and, therefore, it is part of the busi-
ness culture of the cajas rurales.
• Territoriality is understood as the power and right inherent to every caja rural to operate with a
full legal and economic independence in its respective region of activity. 
Therefore, the election of the federate banking formula (Fernández, 1993) meets the need of pro-
viding the cajas rurales with a co-operative banking organised group which promotes their action unity
and brings forward common guarantee and operating instruments which, under business development
principles, assure the survival and growth of the cajas rurales, in order to fully satisfy their users’ (part-
ners and clients) expectations.
The credit co-operative groups share similar business structures which are made up of: local credit
co-operative societies (usually known as primary or local co-operative banks or savings banks); in some
cases, regional co-operative banks (working as intermediaries between local co-operative banks and
the central or central-national co-operative bank, although there is a progressive trend towards the sup-
pression of this intermediate operative stage in some groups); and a central co-operative bank. (Palomo,
1995; González, 1996).
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2.- Structure of the main co-operative banking
groups in Europe This relative homogeneity in the operating organisation structures appears within an institutional
frame which usually takes shape in a credit co-operative societies federation or association. 
Furthermore, the operating structure of the co-operative banking groups is usually completed or
extended with specialised institutions which offer products and services to the credit co-operatives
which are part of these groups, so obtaining a considerable reduction in costs and other synergic effects. 
2.1. Level One: Local Co-operative Banks
The so-called local or primary co-operative banks have a legal statute of credit co-operative soci-
eties. Their region of activity is the municipality or the province, although in some cases these geo-
graphical limits are surpassed; e.g. in Spain, most of the provincial, or primary, cajas rurales are
statutorily and legally authorised to work throughout the country (Palomo, 1999). 
In Spain, there is a distinction among cajas rurales (agricultural savings banks), cajas populares
(popular savings banks), and cajas profesionales (professional savings banks), due to their traditional
specialisation, but almost all of them, in order to be compared with other European groups, can be
identified with the primary or local co-operative banks.
In Germany, primary institutions are credit co-operative societies with the particular name of
“Raiffeisenbanken” (similar to the Spanish cajas rurales) and “Volksbanken”, which are popular or pro-
fessional and preferably urban institutions (Aschoff and Hennigsen, 1985).
In France, the Crédit Agricole Mutuel group has local credit co-operative societies called “Caisses
Locales de Crédit Agricole”, regulated by a 1885 Law in which their essential institutional role is empha-
sised as opposed to an almost testimonial banking operativity (which is in the hands of the regional
savings banks).
In Italy, the legal statute of the local co-operative banks also corresponds to credit co-operative
societies, here called “banche di credito cooperativo”, although they were known as “casse rurali ed
artigiane” until 1995.
Finally, the Dutch co-operative banks are statutorily independent credit co-operatives (although
they take the trade name of the group central institution, being generically identified as “rabobanks”).
They are legally considered “organised co-operative banks”, although it should be noticed that the
Dutch legal compilation does not expressly include the co-operative society form, which is compared
to the association form. 
It could be thought that the smaller the relative size of the local institutions it is, the higher their
cohesion within the groups they make up it will be. This circumstance would be confirmed due to the
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other higher structures and mutual guarantee mechanisms.
The structure of the Spanish cajas rurales consists of: a General Assembly of members, a Board
of Directors (whose members are elected by the General Assembly), a Chairman, and a Managing
Director (a person with professional experience appointed and engaged by the Board of Directors).
Strictly speaking, there is not a Board of Supervision, but together with the internal control mechanisms
(Chaves and Soler, 2004) that every financial institution should have according to the law in force,
the supervision of these institutions is in the hands of the Banco de España (Central Bank of Spain)
and the Public Administrations with competence in this matter.
The German credit co-operatives have a structure made up of: a General Assembly of members,
a Board of Directors (whose members are also elected by the General Assembly), a Managing Director,
and a Board of Supervision. This Board of Supervision or control consists of a minimum of three mem-
bers elected by the General Assembly, and its main function is to make sure that the Board of Directors
works properly.
Apart from this internal control procedure, since 1996, the auditorial functions are carried out by
the regional federations. Therefore, this co-operative banking group had a double control mechanism
external to that developed by the Managing Director: the individual and particular mechanism of every
institution carried out by their Board of Supervision, and the collective mechanism carried out without
harming the supervisory power exerted by the Administration. 
In France, the “caisses locales de crédit agricole” have a structure which consist of: a General
Assembly of members (mainly made up of farmers and companies which have a co-operative form, or
which do not have it, but are related to the agricultural and food industry), a Board of Directors, and an
honorific Chairman. 
The local financial institutions of the Rabobank group are managed by a Board of Directors, con-
trolled by a Board of Supervision. Both boards are appointed by a General Assembly, and the first one
appoints one or more managing directors, who are responsible for the daily activity of every institution. 
As for the Italian local co-operative banks, their structure consists of : a General Assembly of part-
ners (among who there are many farm owners and agricultural and food companies), a Board of
Directors, a kind of Board of Supervision known as “Collegio de Sindaci”, and a Managing Director
(Azzi, 2000).
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Strictly speaking, there is not a direct patrimonial link among the Spanish cajas rurales, although
there is an indirect one (which will be later analysed) among the institutions which constitute the
Asociación Española de Cajas Rurales, whose headquarters are in Madrid.
On the other hand, the cajas rurales, cajas profesionales, and cajas populares are members
(directly; not through regional federations) of the Unión Nacional de Cooperativas de Crédito (UNACC),
which, being the employers’ association of the sector and with its headquarters in Madrid, assumes
their representation. 
In Germany, local co-operative banks are indirectly linked, through regional federations of credit
co-operatives and the National Federation of Popular Banks and Raiffeisen Banks, known as
Bundesverband der Deutschen Volksbanken und Raiffeisenbaken (BVR), with its headquarters in Bonn.
The BVR is, at the same time, related to the rest of the German co-operative sectors through the
German Confederation of Co-operatives, known as the Deutscher Genossenschafts und
Raiffeisenverband (DGRV). It should be noticed that in Germany, the merger between local co-oper-
ative banks and the German central co-operative bank DG Bank is not allowed by statutory provisions
of this Bank (Aschoff and Hennigsen, 1985).
In France there is not either a direct patrimonial link among the “caisses locales de crédit agricole”,
but there is an indirect decisional and financial link which is established through the regional federa-
tions, to which these savings banks belong. At the same time, these federations take part in the national
federation or confederation, known as Fédération Nationale du Crédit Agricole (FNCA), with its head-
quarters in Paris.
In Italy, the active presence of the local co-operative banks federations should be pointed out, which
have authority over the operating structure of these local institutions. Nevertheless, there is neither a
link in this case among local credit co-operatives, and they are only linked through the federations, or
in some particular operating aspects in which more than one institution work together. In order to
become a member of the Group, it is indispensable that the co-operative bank belongs to a federation,
to which it contributes economically by paying membership fees.
Furthermore, in this Italian group, local co-operative banks are members, through the regional fed-
erations, of a national confederation known as Federazione Italiana delle Banche di Crédito
Cooperativo.
In the Netherlands, there is not an intermediate operating level made up of regional co-operative
banks. This fact makes it easier the relations among the local institutions of this group, which is char-
acterised by a strong cohesion (established by the principle of permanent membership).
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European groups analysed (as it could be, for example, by means of cross-holdings), but such link is
established through higher representative or operating levels. In the second case, local co-operative
banks participate in the share capital and the governing bodies of the regional co-operative banks (in
some cases), of the central co-operative banks, or the institutions which offer common services in a
centralised way.
2.1.2. Activity of Local Co-operative Banks
The groups previously analysed show that local co-operative banks or savings banks are fully inde-
pendent to launch their own product and service policies, within the limits established by law and/or the
statutes which these institutions follow in every co-operative banking group.
In many cases, and especially in the co-operative credit groups which have the most cohesion, the
development of all new products, or some of them, is in the hands of the central co-operative banks.
This is a relatively common fact, above all with complex or specialised services (such as international
transactions and transactions within financial markets difficult to reach, or initiatives which require a
considerable critical mass of activity to become profitable, or just feasible).
It has been found that there are no impositions of products and services policies by the central co-
operative banks to the local ones, although, according to the information given, in some cases higher
institutions launch certain products and services, whose distribution is offered by them in competitive
conditions to local credit co-operatives. This method is usual within the German co-operative banking
group, and it is much more than usual within the groups which operate with the principle of perma-
nent membership or community. This is the case of the Dutch Rabobank group and the regional sav-
ings banks of the Crédit Agricole Mutuel group in relation to their local institutions.
In this respect, it should be pointed out that the “caisses locales de crédit agricole” have a mere
role of channels for applications for loans, which are sent to the corresponding regional savings banks,
what confirms their limited banking operating capacity.
The local co-operative banks of the Dutch Rabobank group, according to the principle of perma-
nent membership they have with the central bank, carry out their activity independently, but they are
considerably subjected to the guidelines established by the central bank. These guidelines mainly affect
their strategic policy (i.e. permission is required to open new branch offices in order to avoid mutual
competence among institutions within the Group), and risk supervision and control. In short, local insti-
tutions are free - in theory- to offer their own products and services to their members and customers;
but in practice they operate as franchises for a wide range of these products and services which are
developed by the central bank.
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policy, to the supervision carried out by regional federations, and, although they are fully indepen-
dent to offer their own products, some of them are developed by the central bank. In the same way,
local federations and the national federation “recommend” their members the use of certain common
services (Cafaro, 1999).
2.2. Level Two: Regional Co-operative Banks
The regional co-operative banks which are part of some of the credit co-operative groups analysed,
usually have a legal statute of superior credit co-operative societies. However, in some cases, they are
stock companies, mainly shared by local co-operative banks and co-operative societies from other
management sectors.
These regional co-operative banks have the role of an intermediate operating level between local
co-operative banks and the central co-operative bank. They originated mainly due to the already sat-
isfied need which, in the past, demanded the creation of regional institutions which worked as com-
pensating and balancing instruments of financial flows among the different regions in some countries,
due to the seasonality of productions. In other cases, as it happened in France, they originated by law.
In Germany, regional co-operative banks have been gradually disappearing since the 60s, and
those which are already extinguished have transferred their functions to the central DZ BANK. This
trend towards the disappearing of regional institutions seems to lead to a group with only two levels
and it may be a consequence of the fact that many times the existence of this kind of institutions raises
the price of products and services, and affects the group operating capacity and efficiency.
In France, the existence of regional agricultural savings banks (caisses regionales de crédit agri-
cole) with a legal form of secondary credit co-operative societies with a variable capital, according to
the 1894 Law, is justified due to the reduced and limited operating capacity of the local agricultural sav-
ings banks. These local institutions are members of the regional ones, assuming a mere function of
depository institutions, being the regional savings banks responsible for the real credit activity and the
development of products and services (local savings banks contribute with the funds they get, and
transfer them in the form of deposits to their corresponding regional savings banks).
The share capital of the regional savings banks belongs to local savings banks and other co-oper-
ative societies (usually quite large agricultural and food co-operatives). As co-operatives, they have
a Board of Directors (usually made up of the chairmen of local savings banks), a Managing Director
and a Chairman. 
There are no regional co-operative banks within the Dutch group, but there is a certain division of
the territorial areas of local institutions into 43 areas, in order to allow an easy way of regional repre-
sentation.
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suffered in 1962, the setting up of an intermediate operating level made up of regional co-operative
banks, in a similar way to the European German and French co-operative banking groups (Oppo, 1996).
Collaboration between the Italian local co-operative banks and regional banks is voluntary, and, as
for the activity of these regional institutions, it is the same as in the local ones, that is to say, every insti-
tution is fully independent to offer its own products and services, although some of them are launched
by the central bank. In the same way, the national federation recommends the offering of certain ser-
vices which are common to the Group.
In conclusion, there is not a direct economic link among the co-operative banking groups which
have regional co-operative banks. As it happens with local co-operative banks, they are indirectly linked
through the national federations and/or as shareholders of the share capital which the central co-oper-
ative banks have.
2.3. Level Three: Central Co-operative Banks
All the European co-operative banking groups which are fairly developed, including those which
have not been analysed in this report, have a central co-operative bank.
The setting up of this kind of institution appears in the history of every one of their respective co-
operative banking groups as an achievement inherent to the development process of this credit form,
and also as an answer to a number of real needs which need the development, in a centralised way,
of certain activities and operations (Cals, 2000).
The groups analysed prove the growing leading role of the central co-operative banks within the
co-operative bank groups on which they are based. This is the consequence of the need to reach a
higher competitiveness within the financial group and the gradual introduction of concepts, such as
global banking, within a more and more inter-related economic environment. In this sense, the cen-
tral co-operative banks allow the centralising of certain operating aspects, and the obtaining of enough
critical mass to operate with an enough profit margin in the financial markets.
Even so, the role played by central co-operative banks does not harm the operating and deci-
sion-making independence which characterises and is the base for the local credit co-operatives, but
it tries to foster their cohesion as a Group of institutions which share an identity and an aim. The cen-
tral banks also manage a joint offering of services which are becoming more and more complex and
specialised. All this has as a result a higher satisfaction for customers and users, who have access to
services with competitive quality and prices. 
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of the sector, and the linking of credit co-operatives with a whole range of companies specialised in
offering certain central services which are gradually becoming essential for the activity of any mod-
ern banking group. 
As for their legal nature, the central co-operative banks analysed are not credit co-operative soci-
eties, but stock societies (usually limited companies), whose shareholders are, mainly, the credit co-
operative societies which make up every respective co-operative banking group (Cöté, 2001). Among
their shareholders, there are usually co-operatives from other sectors of activity. 
The guideline for the functioning of this kind of central institutions is the above-mentioned princi-
ple of subsidiariness, which is intended to meet certain operative needs which credit co-operatives
have by the transfer of particular services and/or activities to specialised structures from the group
itself, so that they are successfully satisfied.
In particular, the functions that central co-operative banks carry out for their shareholder or mem-
ber institutions are usually those related to services which should be developed in a centralised way,
in order to obtain economies of scale and management, such as those concerning clearing and means
of payment, activity within national and international financial markets, institutional and corporate bank-
ing, and specialised and advising services (such as international trade operations, stock in companies,
etc.). In short, everything which is known as universal banking services (one of whose main compo-
nents is, in this case, retail banking). In this way, the “users” of central co-operative banks are mainly:
local co-operative banks or savings banks, regional co-operative banks or savings banks (in case they
exist), and customers outside the Group (institutions and large companies, including the head offices
from other co-operative sectors).
The fact that central co-operative banks carry out their own independent banking activity, usually
assuming business with large companies and national institutions, limits a possible competition with
the activity of local credit co-operatives. This characteristic is inherent to the statutory rules of the cen-
tral institutions, and, in many cases, it is possible due to the power they have to represent, on their own
behalf, the financial capacity of the total of the institutions of the Group (i.e. in the Dutch group, the
consolidation of balance sheets of credit co-operatives with the central bank is allowed). This allows
the access to companies and markets which local credit co-operatives could not easily reach by them-
selves. In this sense, all the co-operative banking groups analysed allow central institutions to have
their own branch offices in certain strategic national and international places, and, even in certain areas
not covered by the local co-operative banks (“shadow areas”). 
The credit co-operative societies which are the base for their respective co-operative banking
groups take part, through their representatives, in the decision-making structures of the central co-
operative banks.
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capital of the Banco Cooperativo Español, S.A., whose headquarters are in Madrid. The remaining 15%
belongs to the German central co-operative bank, the Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank (DZ BANK).
These shareholder institutions have the right to vote in proportion to their stock participation in the
General Assembly of Shareholders of the Bank, which must elect the members for the Board of
Directors, which, among other things, has to appoint a Managing Director (Asociación Española de
Cajas Rurales, 1997).
In the same way, in Germany, the “Raiffeisenbanken” and “Volksbanken” participate directly (when
there are no regional co-operative banks in their area) or through regional co-operative banks (when
there are in their area) in the share capital of the DZ BANK, whose headquarters are in Frankfurt am
Main.
The governing and decision-making structure of the DZ BANK is made up of a General Assembly
of Shareholders (where, as it has been previously mentioned, the German State has to participate by
Law), a Board of Directors (whose members are elected by the General Assembly, and whose func-
tion, among others, is the appointment of  an auditor with the consent of the Federal Minister of Finance),
an Executive Committee (whose members are elected by the Board of Directors, which also appoints
a Chairman for this Committee and one or more deputy Chairmen). Moreover, Advising Councils may
be created for the respective regional administrations or offices which are under the Bank itself.
In France, the Crédit Agricole Mutuel group has a central co-operative bank, the Caisse National
de Crédit Agricole (CNCA), whose headquarters are in Paris, and which is the central operating struc-
ture of the Group. Its function is the co-ordination of the activity of the regional and local savings banks.
This Bank was a public institution since its setting up in 1920 until the Mutualisation Law came into
force in 1988. Since then, it has legally become a private limited company.
The managing and governing structures of the Caisse Nationale de Crédit Agricole (CNCA) are
made up of a Board of Directors (whose members are chairmen and managing directors of the regional
savings banks and representatives of the employees); a Managing Director, and a Chairman (plus, in
some cases, one or more deputy Chairmen).
The existence of a supervisory structure in the French group, known as Direction de Inspection,
which is part of the operative structure of the CNCA, must be pointed out as well.
In the Dutch co-operative banking group, the central co-operative bank is known as the Cöoperative
Centrale Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank Nederland (Rabobank Nederland), with its headquarters in Utrecht,
and created in 1972 by the merger of the two Dutch co-operative central banks which existed at that
time. It is a stock private company, whose capital belongs to all the local co-operative banks and other
minor co-operative institutions. 
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assembles 3,000 representatives from the local co-operative banks). This Assembly has to approve
or reject the important decisions which affect the activity of the Group or the central bank. Furthermore,
it elects the members for the Board of Directors of the Rabobank Nederland (made up of between 5
and 9 members of the local co-operative banks, whose role is to look after the interests of these insti-
tutions and their members from the managing structures of the central bank). There is also an Executive
Committee (which is in charge of the managing of the daily banking activity within the central bank),
and a Supervisory Committee. Apart from this governing structures, there is a Labour Council, where
all the employees’ categories of the Group, from the local co-operative banks as well as the central
bank, are represented.
In Italy, the Istituto Centrale delle Banche di Crédito Cooperativo (until 1995 known as Istituto
Centrale delle Casse Rurali de Artigiane or ICCREA), is the central co-operative bank of the group. It
was created in November 1963, with the double purpose of completing the project for the integration
of the Italian agricultural co-operative credit, and avoiding the dependence of the local institutions on
others outside the banking sector. This institution has a legal statute of a stock company, and its share-
holders are the local and regional institutions. Its managing and governing structures are a Board of
Directors, an Executive Committee, the “Collegio dei Sindaci” (similar to a Board of Supervision), and
a Managing Director.
In Spain, the cajas rurales are linked to the Banco Cooperativo Español through the Asociación
Española de Cajas Rurales, which has a certain federate character- although it cannot be solely con-
sidered as such- and which carries out the function of an institutional frame in which the activity of
the Bank is developed. Moreover, the cajas rurales participate in the managing of the Banco
Cooperativo Español with the votes which, as shareholders, they have in the General Assembly, in
proportion to their respective volume of total Assets (Melian, 2004).
In Germany, local credit co-operatives participate in the managing of the DG BANK by means of
their direct or indirect stock participation through the regional co-operative banks. Furthermore, the
German Federation of Volksbanken und Raiffeisenbanken (BVR) takes part as well in the managing
of the DG BANK regarding the control of its aims and the preservation of the principles which inspire
its activity. 
In France, the caisses locales de crédit agricole participate only indirectly in the central institution
CNCA, since the regional savings banks (not the local ones) are those which have its share capital as
shareholders. In any case, the national federation respects the interests of the local savings banks
through the regional ones and looks after the fulfilment of the commitments which the central bank has
with the institutions of the Group.
The Dutch co-operative savings banks participate directly in the managing of the central institution
through 24 Regional Meetings of Representatives, which are held twice a year. The representatives in
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the central bank Rabobank Nederland make up the so-called Centrale Kringvergadering, which is a
Central Meeting of Representatives, who meet every trimester. Therefore, it is here where local co-
operative banks mainly define and discuss the policy of the Group.
In a similar way, in Italy, local co-operative banks participate as shareholders in the Istituto Centrale
delle Banche di Credito Cooperativo.
The European co-operative banking groups have specialised institutions, which offer certain activ-
ities, in a common or centralised way, to the credit co-operatives which make up the basis of these
groups. 
These institutions have very specific functions in certain fields of activity directly or indirectly related
to the particular activity of the financial intermediaries. 
They are intended to satisfy the demand of products and services by partners and users of the
credit co-operatives, with the adequate guarantees and quality levels. They pursue, at the same time,
the obtaining of economies of scale and synergic effects through the managing of a volume of opera-
tions enough for these products and services to be profitable or, at least, to allow a decrease in the
excessive costs which, otherwise, they would have to face if such products and services had to be
offered in an individual and isolate way by each one of the credit co-operatives which are part of the
group (Palomo, 2004).
Nowadays, these activities have surpassed the genuine and strictly banking field, and their offer
has expanded towards other adjacent fields derived from the main one. 
This is a consequence of desintermediation and deregulation and the particular need of looking for
new business areas which compensate the increasing competence among financial intermediaries,
and, at the same time, as it has been previously mentioned, the need of trying to satisfy the growing
demand of integrated services by users. 
The wide range of such activities makes it necessary to distinguish three large groups, although
the limits of their classification are only relatively clear: centralised banking activities, centralised para-
banking activities, and other centralised activities. 
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3.- Classification and characteristics of
centralised activities within the co-operative
banking groups 3.1. Centralised Banking Activities
The centralised banking activities are usually offered by the different departments of the central
co-operative banks, such as the foreign department, money and currency markets, treasury man-
agement, clearing operations, means of payment, stock market, investment and business banking, etc. 
Nevertheless, in many cases, the degree of specialisation or complexity of some activities and their
considerable volume have propitiated the creation of independent institutions with very particular func-
tions, but also created within the co-operative banking groups, which so release the central co-oper-
ative banks from some of the functions that they have. This is the case, for example, of mortgage banks,
financial leasing companies, securities firms, etc., which could appear in the section of parabanking
activities (which later will be dealt with).
Obviously, the offering of centralised banking activities has a cost. When they are considered as
daily activities within the banking operating functions, and they are offered from the corresponding
departments of the central co-operative banks, their cost is usually assumed by these central institu-
tions, and, even more, since their use may be statutorily compulsory for the credit co-operatives of the
Group. 
However, other activities may have a price group for the institutions which use them. This group
usually works through a fixed fee, due to the availability of these activities, which may be more or
less increased, in proportion to the average volume of activity (which may be lineal or degressive,
depending on the case).
In Spain, the co-operative savings banks member of the Asociación Española de Cajas Rurales
have the Banco Cooperativo Español (BCE), set up in 1990 and with its headquarters in Madrid, to
offer centralised banking services to the institutions of the Group. The stock participation in this Bank
of the member institutions is compulsory, according to a statutory provision.
Its functions, among others, are the co-ordination of the financial policy of the shareholder cajas
rurales, the development of specific financial services, and the action as a dealer in participated oper-
ations.
This Bank has different areas of specialised business: a large companies area, an international
area, a commercial banking area, a money, capital and foreign exchange markets area, and a clear-
ing and means of payment area.
As for the operating question, the participation of the Bank in certain services and activities is com-
pulsory concerning treasury, means of payment and exchange operations, and voluntary concerning
the rest of the services offered. 
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which may offer similar services to those of the Banco Cooperativo Español, and which are compul-
sory. In any case, any caja rural is allowed to establish and develop by itself the services which the
Bank may offer, but whose use is voluntary. 
The price of these services is established through a fixed fee according to their availability, plus a
variable amount, which is applied in proportion to the average volume of activity of every caja rural with
regard to the services used. Prices will be adapted to market prices and costs as much as possible, so
that they do not produce relevant benefits or losses to the Bank.
The benefits obtained by the Banco Cooperativo Español may be distributed among its shareholder
institutions in the form of dividends and in proportion to their participation in the share capital (which
is proportional to their respective volume of Assets in relation to the total of the shareholder cajas
rurales).
In Germany, the DZ BANK offers centralised banking services to credit co-operatives. These insti-
tutions are no obliged to use such services, but there is a formal agreement which recommends their
use. In practice, this agreement is not very relevant, since due to the proved efficiency of this institu-
tion and the wide range of services which offers to the credit co-operatives of the Group, they obtain
significant economies of scale, which they could not reach if they operated with other intermediaries
outside the group. In any case, the absence of a statutory obligation to operate with these centralised
services makes it impossible any legal procedure against the credit co-operatives, in case they refused
to work with such services.
The price group used to offer these services from the central bank to the member institutions of the
group is mainly based on a fee which is proportional to the volume of activity achieved with this ser-
vice, although regarding some atypical activities, a fixed fee may be established, or even a price may
be negotiated.
With regard to the DZ BANK, it assumes certain functions of a central institution, which do not allow
to consider it exclusively as an institution whose task is mainly the offering of centralised banking ser-
vices. Its functions are, among others, the control of the legal regulation of the institutions of the Group,
and the necessary approval by this Bank of the relevant decisions made within the specialised cen-
tral services companies, which could consist of modifications in the capital share or in its ownership,
business strategies, non forecast investments, etc.
In short, the DZ BANK is, at the same time, a central services co-operative bank, a central insti-
tution, and a bank with its own commercial activity, and independent from the rest of the institutions
of the Group.
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ilar to those of any other banking group. Furthermore, it assumes relevant functions as the head insti-
tution of the co-operative banking group on which it is based. Some of these functions are: co-ordination
of the activity of local and regional savings banks, approval of the annual accounts of the regional sav-
ings banks, previous authorisation to the granting of certain loans by the regional savings banks, estab-
lishment of common commercial policies for the total of the credit co-operatives of the Group,
co-ordination of international trade operations, management and co-ordination of subsidiaries in their
country or abroad, etc. 
The price group established for the central services offered by this central institution to the mem-
ber institutions of the Group is similar to the German one; so, there are fixed fees for certain services,
and fees which are proportional to the volume of activity for other services. 
The functions of the French central co-operative bank are quite extensive, and surpass those of
other central co-operative banks, such as the Spanish or the Italian ones, although it does not have as
many functions as the Rabobank Nederland in the Dutch group.
In this sense, the functions of the central bank Rabobank Nederland can be divided into three cat-
egories:
• It plays the role of a central bank, which obligates it to offer administrative and advising ser-
vices to local co-operative banks, and to supervise them constantly (according to the legal
order of the Dutch central bank Nederlandsche Bank). At the same time, it establishes the
global strategies and aims of the total of the local co-operative banks, but allowing the ade-
quate flexibility so that every bank has its own operating independence. 
• It carries out its own independent banking activity, which mainly tends towards the corporate
banking of large companies and the international activity. All this makes it a profitable com-
plement to the total of the co-operative banks. 
• It operates as the central treasurer of the Group, it carries out functions of liquidity clearing and
acts as a channel for the treasury surplus of the local co-operative banks. In fact, the direct
transfer of funds among co-operative banks is not allowed, but all the operations of this kind
must be made through the central bank.
Other aspects which should be pointed out in the relation between local co-operative banks and
the central Rabobank Nederland are the following:
• The local institutions must report, every three months, on the loans granted (some of them
must even be approved by the central bank).
• They must buy shares in the share capital of the central bank in proportion to their volume of
Assets.
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avoid situations of mutual competence. In the same way, the opening of new branch offices
has to be previously approved by the central institution.
• Any modification in the statutes or functioning rules of the local co-operative banks has to be
approved by the central institution.
• At an accountant level, the total of the Dutch co-operative banks carry out the balance sheets
consolidation together with the central bank.
The main fields of activity of the Rabobank Nederland, in relation to the central services which
offers, are: money and capital markets, derived products, foreign service, corporate banking and invest-
ment banking.
The price group for the central services offered by the Rabobank Nederland to local co-operative
banks, in most cases related to the typical activities of banking intermediation, is based on the payment
of commissions proportional to the volume of activity. With some services in which the administrative
management prevail against their volume of activity, a fixed fee is usually established (for example,
in partnering operations, etc.).
In Italy, the central co-operative bank, known as Istituto Centrale delle Banche di Credito
Cooperativo, carries out all the functions which are particular and common in a central bank and which,
therefore, are similar to those of other European central co-operative banks. These functions are, among
others, those concerning treasury, stocks market, electronic banking, credits syndicated with the local
co-operative banks, international activity, etc. 
The group of contributing to the costs of the centralised banking services implies that every Italian
local or regional co-operative bank pays only its corresponding fee according to its volume of activity
with every service used. Moreover, there is not a statutory obligation for local co-operative banks to
participate in these central services, and it is allowed that these institutions operate with financial inter-
mediaries outside the Group. 
In case these centralised services were profitable, the Italian local and regional co-operative banks
would take part in them through the dividends which corresponded them as shareholders of the cen-
tral co-operative bank.
The co-operative banking groups analysed prove that, although in certain particular cases it could
happen that any centralised banking service were slightly more expensive for the credit co-opera-
tives than if they obtained it from other intermediaries outside the group, it is true that the total of the
services offered are highly profitable; so the presence of central institutions is completely justified. 
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out the functions of head institutions of their respective groups, sometimes under a principle of per-
manent membership which strengthens cohesion among co-operative banks, their self-identification
as members of a group, their financial status, and their competitiveness.
Due to that fact, central co-operative banks are much more than an instrument to centralise cer-
tain banking services in order to obtain economies of scale for the local credit co-operatives; that is
to say, they are institutions with their own identity, which long ago lost their original role of instrumen-
tal institutions, assuming nowadays extensive and growing functions, with which they guide and lead
the development of the co-operative banking groups. 
3.2. Centralised Parabanking activities
In the so-called parabanking activities, it is usual to include products and services related to insur-
ance business, investment funds and pension plans agencies (although they are becoming more and
more essential in the banking activity itself), partnering or the search for partners and commercial con-
tacts for customers and users, advising on foreign markets, leasing, factoring, credit cards and bank-
ing debit services, travel agencies, intermediation or participation in real estate operations and
promotions, and as many activities as the growing of a banking group may offer. 
This type of specialised activities are usually offered by companies created within the co-opera-
tive groups themselves, which, despite their independent legal status as differentiated business areas,
they work for the whole of the credit co-operatives on which they are based in their respective groups.
These types of companies are subsidiary companies, and the local credit co-operatives as well as the
central co-operative banks participate in their share capital. 
As for the economic maintenance of the specialised institutions which carry out these activities,
there are usually two basic types of financing.
In some cases, a price group is established in relation to the use of the services that credit co-oper-
atives make. This fee may even be compulsory, although that particular activity is not used, and it is
considered as infrastructure expenses inherent to the membership of credit co-operatives to their cor-
responding co-operative banking group. This is justified if the Group considers that these added activ-
ities benefit the institutions which are part of this Group, allowing them to increase their services offer
and becoming a way to increase their number of members and customers. In the same way, co-oper-
ative savings banks are usually required to contribute with money to the establishment of the share
capital of these specialised institutions.
In most cases, these companies do not produce any functioning cost (although there could be an
establishment cost) for the credit co-operatives of every group. In this case, every specialised com-
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ative banks, using their network for the distribution of their products and services. In exchange, co-
operative banks may receive a commission for every operation in which they act as intermediaries,
and/or may participate as shareholders in the profits of the specialised companies. A typical case is
insurance business.
3.3. Other Centralised Activities
Under this section, different activities which may be or are usually carried out within the co-oper-
ative banking groups are grouped. These may be considered as infrastructure, support or logistic activ-
ities; so they are more related to the internal functioning of these groups than with the particular
commercial activity which the institutions carry out for their members and users.
These activities are, among others: centralised data and information processing and computer cov-
erage of the operating network; training of employees (in their different levels and categories); legal
and technical advising to the institutions of the group; spreading activity, institutional relations, attain-
ment of combined agreements between the institutions of the group and third parties, the defence of
communal interests, etc. 
It is evident that the functions which have a more representative character require a centralised co-
ordination, which is usually assumed by national federations or associations; whereas the functions
which have an operating character or a higher technical or technological character are carried out by
specialised institutions (as it usually happens with computer services).
The cost of most of the functions and services offered by the federate structures is covered with
the membership fees of every member and/or with other funds (including possible public grants for
training, conferences, etc.).
Nevertheless, a price group is usually established for the use of the second type of operating ser-
vices offered by specialised companies. This generally happens with data processing centres and with
particular advising and analysis services. 
The credit co-operatives member of the Asociación Española de Cajas Rurales have the services
offered by the company Rural Servicios Informáticos (RSI), set up in 1986 and with its headquarters in
Tres Cantos (Madrid). RSI is responsible for the definition and implementation of a common strategy
regarding the automatic processing of the information of the cajas rurales, contributing with an advanced
centralised computer support which operates as a corporate centre for the whole network.
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operative banking groups has been carried out, it is time to make some general and particular con-
clusions about the different aspects which have been dealt with. In the same way, and according to
the aims established at the beginning of this paper, it has been considered necessary and suitable to
make valuations about the comparison of these European patterns with the Spanish one, made up of
cajas rurales and the central and specialised services companies which belong to the Asociación
Española de Cajas Rurales.
A characteristic feature of all the co-operative banking groups -not only of those analysed here-
is the existence of local co-operative banks or savings banks which are always credit co-operative soci-
eties sharing the same identity and an equivalent legal statute, and carrying out similar functions in the
groups they base.
In all the cases analysed, the adjective local is not used as the particular and official term for these
institutions, but as an agreed term so that they can be distinguished from other regional or secondary
co-operative banks, or from other central, national or tertiary co-operative banks. Moreover, the adjec-
tive “local” is not intended to lessen relevance to these institutions, although their size is usually smaller
than that of the regional or central co-operative banks. In fact, these institutions are the origin, the base
and the centre of activity of the present co-operative credit groups. 
In the same way, it can be proved that the local scope of these institutions has to be understood
in a broad sense, and it cannot to be limited exclusively to a municipality or a determined area. So,
some local credit co-operatives have a higher economic size than the central and/or regional co-oper-
ative banks of their own groups (as it usually happens in Spain); and there are also others which work
in territorial areas higher than the regional banks. Furthermore, it should be indicated that in some
European groups concentrating processes have taken place among credit co-operatives which are
geographically close. 
The excessive proliferation of local credit co-operatives in the past, and the present extremely small
size of many of them has made it necessary a slow and expensive take-over process (still taking place),
which is intended to achieve an operating size more adequate to the present competitiveness and guar-
antee patterns (Sanchís, 2003).
As for the link which could be among the primary credit co-operatives which make up a co-oper-
ative banking group, it can be said that there is not a direct patrimonial connection among them. The
only link they may have is indirectly established through representative common organisations (such
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4.- Conclusionsas national federations or, in some cases, regional ones), or through their independent participation,
but with common effects, in central or specialised services companies which are established within the
co-operative banking groups themselves, and which usually have been jointly promoted by the local
co-operative banks, as it happens with the regional and/or local co-operative banks. 
This fact is relevant and significant for the identification of the business grouping form which char-
acterises the co-operative banking groups. The word “group” has been precisely used in this paper due
to its broad meaning, which makes reference to a set of elements mutually related which is different
from other sets, without the need of specifying how they are related. 
In this respect, as it has been proved in this report, links in the co-operative banking groups or sys-
tems are based neither on inter-societies stock in the share capital nor on parent-subsidiary compa-
nies relations or other forms of corporate control. Due to that fact, form the point of view of the economic
orthodoxy, co-operative banking groups could not be properly called a business group; however,
although they are not legally groups by right, they are groups by act; or, in other words, although they
are not specifically groups, they are implicitly groups. 
In this respect, it has been proved that co-operative banking groups are organised groups which
have common representative and operating structures, whose strategies and main action lines are
developed under common policies or “group” policies which produce an unity of action (Embid, 1995;
Koulychizky, 1991; Barlett and Goshal, 1993). It is also relevant to say that everything is planned with
an indefinite length, and that these groups usually have particular and joint guarantee instruments; and,
even in some cases, legal regulation allows an accountant consolidation, and gives to the groups cen-
tral structures the centralised supervision of their members’ activity, and the responsibility of looking
after the application of legal regulations (this is evident in Holland, and in a more limited way in France
and Germany, but it does not happen in Spain). 
All this justifies the desire that these co-operative banking groups are legally recognised as busi-
ness groups, so that they have a legal consideration equivalent to that of other banking groups. 
It should also be said that the traditional classification of the forms of business grouping, as well
as many economic theories, are suffering a progressive lag, which in some cases does not allow their
adapting to the present business world. This lag process accelerates as the economic development
accelerates too, led by the concepts of globalisation, deregulation, liberalisation or desintermediation,
what it makes it necessary the creation of new concepts or the revision of the contents of these con-
cepts. 
From an even more critical point of view, it could be said that the concept of group by itself is broad
enough so as to leave room for other interpretations, so its vagueness can also be applied to the con-
cept of business group, although this one seeks protection, out of habit, in the traditional interpretation
(Barea, Juliá, Monzón, 1999).
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fields of activity, or in very specific services, which have a double aim. On the one hand, they try to
make it possible that their users have access, with enough guarantees of success, to an offer of prod-
ucts and services made by the group, and which in some cases complements the offer made by every
co-operative institution itself. On the other hand, the central services structures make sure that the
credit co-operatives can obtain economies of scale in all the activities in which the attainment of such
cost saving is possible if their managing is carried out in a centralised way for the whole of the group
institutions, and which, due to operating reasons, require a certain critical mass of activity which can-
not be easily reached individually working.
Therefore, the range of centralised services may be as extensive as the co-operative banking
groups want, but their endowment and establishment depend on strictly economic reasons; that is to
say, that it will be suitable the creation of a centralised service if it allows the obtaining of value added
to the whole of the institutions of the group. This more or less flexible economising reason is the one
which must be applied in all business activities, independently that they are developed or not in a co-
operative way, since the aim of the company (of all companies) is just to create value added for their
owners, who, in this case, are the members at the base.
Globalisation many times leads to uniformity and the attenuation or elimination of diversity
(Schediwy, 1997). This demands an answer to balance this state of affairs, and to make co-operative
credit to be identified as a member of the financial community which consciously wants to continue
being different (Soler, 2002; Spear, 1997), providing a particular business culture and a peculiar, but
very effective and efficient, organisation form.
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Banks
(The existence and compulsory or voluntary character of every service is indicated)
SERVICES SPAIN GERMANY ITALY FRANCE THE NEDERL.
Treasury management Yes/compul. Yes/compul. Yes/vol. Yes/compul. Yes/compul.
Clearing and means of payment Yes/compul. Yes/compul. Yes/vol. Yes/compul. Yes/compul.
Money Market and Foreign Exchange Yes/compul. Yes/compul. Yes/vol. Yes/compul. Yes/compul.
Participated loans Yes/vol. Yes/compul. Yes/vol. Yes/compul. Yes/compul.
Public resources channelling   Yes/vol. Yes/compul. Yes/vol. Yes/compul. Yes/compul.
Public Debt Management Yes/vol. Yes/compul. Yes/vol. Yes/compul. Yes/compul.
Institutional banking  Yes/vol. Yes/vol. Yes/vol. Yes/compul. Yes/compul.
Large companies banking Yes/vol. Yes/vol. Yes/vol. Yes/vol. Yes/compul.
Commercial banking Yes/vol. Yes/vol. Yes/vol. Yes/vol. Yes/compul.
International banking Yes/vol. Yes/compul. Yes/vol. Yes/compul. Yes/compul.
Advising on investment No Yes/vol. Yes/vol. Yes/vol. Yes/vol.
Risk analysis/supervision No Yes/vol. Yes/vol. Yes/compul. Yes/compul.
Electronic/phone banking* Yes(in project) Yes/vol. Yes/vol. Yes/compul. Yes/compul.
Credit cards…* Yes/vol. Yes/compul. Yes/vol. Yes/compul. Yes/compul.
Investment/pension funds* Yes/vol. Yes/vol. Yes/vol. Yes/compul. Yes/vol.
Leasing and factoring* Yes/vol. Yes/vol. Yes/vol. Yes/vol. Yes/compul.
(*) Theses services are usually offered by independent managing societies or specialised institutions.
Source: own elaboration from questionaries.
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fee plus a variable 
amount depending 




(No fees are paid 
for the use of 
particular services, 
but a general fee 
may be paid as a 
federation membership 
fee, etc.)
Source: own elaboration from questionaries.
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- Usually in the typical 
services of central 
co-operative banks.
- Common in individualised or
voluntary complex services.
* Usually participation in the
share capital is compulsory,
with a possible sharing out of
dividends. 
A FEW CASES
- Only in some cases and pre-
ferably in statutorily compul-





- Usually there are no fees for
the services offered by specia-
lised companies outside the
central co-operative banks. 
* Participation in the share
capital may be compulsory,
and in such case, with a possi-
ble sharing out of dividends.
MOST CASES
- Co-operative banks operate
as a distributing network.
- Co-operative banks receive
direct commissions and possi-
ble dividends if they participate







- Common in data processing
centres and network centralised
computer management centres. 
- Usually it is compulsory to
operate with this services.
* The possible results are divi-
ded among shareholders or




- They are usually services offe-
red by federations regarding
training, legal advising, informa-
tion, etc.)
- Fees may be paid with very
particular services, individually
demanded to federations.Table 3. Names And Areas Of Activity Of Specialised
Institutions In The Credit Co-Operative Groups
AREA OF ACTIVITY SPAIN GERMANY ITALY FRANCE THE
(Cajas Rurales) (Volksbanken- (Banche di (Crédit Agricole) NETHERLANDS
Raiffeisenbanken) Credito Cooperativo) (Rabobank)
BANKING SERVICES Banco Coop. Esp. DG BANK ICCREA CNCA RABOBANK
INSURANCE BUSINESS Seguros RGA R+V Versicherung Assimoco PREDICA PACIFICA Interpolis
DATA PROCESSING CENTRES Rural Servicios  BIK Coopeld CEDICAM Rabofacet
Informáticos (Only a certain hardware)
TRAVELLING AND TOURISM Rural Tours RV. Touristik
MORTGAGES DG HYP. Münchener  Rabohypotheekbank
Hypothekenbank
LEASING Deutsche Genossen-  Autolease UNICOMI/UNIMAT 
schafts. Leasing and UCABAIL
FACTORING DG Diskontbank De Lage Landen Factors 
INVESTMENT FUNDS Gescooperativo Coogestioni
FINANCIAL MARKETS DG Direkt SEGESPAR HP Verbist BV
AGRICULTURAL FINANCING SOFIDECA
LARGE COMPANIES FINANCING UNICREDIT De Lage L. Finance
MARKETING OF PRODUCTS DG Agropartners
AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT SOFIPAR
AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY SOGEQUIP





TRAINING Scuola Centrale del 
Credito Cooperativo
PUBLICATIONS DG Verlag Ecra
Source: own elaboration from questionaries.
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Full Member Organisations
BELGIË/BELGIQUE/BELGIEN - Belgium
Crédit Professionnel  (a) n/a n/a 9 n/a 44 2.046 220 1.219 n/a n/a
BÃLGARIJA - Bulgaria/Bulgarie/Bulgarien
Central Co-operative Bank  n/a 220 5.631 741.052 1.375 579 484 277 2,67 2,43
CYPRUS - Chypre/Zypern
Co-operative Central Bank 293 473 535.000 600.000 2.250 9.739 9.048 6.756 22,81 21,70
DANMARK - Denmark/Danemark/Dänemark
Sammenslutningen Danske Andelskasser (a) 29 80 64.000 122.000 483 1.221 954 848 0,50 0,50
DEUTSCHLAND - Germany/Allemagne
BVR/DZ BANK 1.255 14.100 16.000.000 30.000.000 187.000* 961.200* 551.000* 497.700* 15,80 11,80
ÉIRE - Ireland/Irlande/Irland 
Irish Sea Fisheries Board (a) 1 1 n/a 15 94 7.393 0 1.165 n/a n/a
ESPAÑA - Spain/Espagne/Spanien
Unión Nacional de Cooperativas de Crédito 83 4.822 1.912.287 9.878.047 19.334 96.208 82.466 77.219 5,03 5,24
FRANCE - France/Frankreich
Crédit Agricole 41 11.000 5.700.000 31.000.000 157.000 1.381.000 438.100 544.600 25,00 20,90
Crédit Mutuel 18 5.065 6.900.000 14.500.000 58.380 482.676 422.800 220.000 12,4 16,80
Banques Populaires  20 2.880 3.200.000 7.000.000 34.994 204.000 92.000 109.000 6,2 8,2
HELLAS - Greece/Grece/Griechenland
Association of Cooperative Banks of Greece   16 145 175.541 175.541 974 2.570 2.135 1.935 0,8 1
ITALIA - Italy/Italie/Italien 
Assoc. Nazionale fra le Banche Popolari 89 7.808 1.065.000 8.100.000 73.269 374.600 267.100 251.300 21,90 20,10
FEDERCASSE 438 3.758 822.893 5.000.000 27.835 136.941 111.084 94.305 8,40 6,60
(a) 2005 figures          (1):  Estimate           n/a: Not applicable
* Addition Kreditgenossenschaften+ DZ BANK-Konzern+WGZ-Bank-Konzern+MHB eG
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LUXEMBOURG - Luxemburg 
Banque Raiffeisen 13 55 5.560 120.000 460 3.695 3.086 2.123 10,00 10,00
LIETUVOJE - Lithuania/Lituanie/Litauen
Association of Lithuanian credit unions 59 132 68.267 68.841 346 161 105 85 1,20 0,77
MAGYARORSZÀG - Hungary/Hongrie/Ungarn
National Federation of Savings Co-operatives  143 1.664 250.000 1.000.000 7.909 4.470 3.940 1.900 9,88 3,60
NEDERLAND - Netherlands/Pays-Bas/Niederlande
Rabobank Nederland 188 1.402 1.641.000 9.000.000 56.209 556.455 215.899 324.110 39,00 25,50
ÖSTERREICH  - Austria/Autriche 
Österreichische Raiffeisenbanken 578 1.732 1.657.186 3.600.000 31.120 205.361 114.395 118.859 27,78 23,42
Österreichischer Genossenschaftsverband  88 842 673.158 1.500.000 11.336 82.074 54.301 45.576 7,10 7,70
POLSKA - Poland/Pologne/Polen 
Krajowy Zwiazek Banków Spóldzielczych 584 3.790 2.500.000 10.500.000 28.899 10.993 8.396 5.801 12,28 8,23
PORTUGAL
FENACAM (a) 111 665 300.000 1.200.000 3.677 9.365 8.146 6.864 5,00 3,00
ROMÂNIA - Romania/Roumanie/Rumänien
Creditcoop 124 811 760.000 1.103.851 2.562 159 82 116 1,00 0,70
SUOMI-FINLAND - Finland/Finlande/Finnland
OP-Pohjola Group 232 670 1.160.000 4.000.000 12.139 59.500 25.800 39.600 32,70 31,10
SLOVENIJE - Slovenia/Slowenien
Dezelna Banka Slovenije d.d. 1 87 244 172.602 402 621 480 330 2,24 1,38
SVERIGE - Sweden/Suède/Schweden
Landshypotek   (b) 10 10 69.216 69.216 107 3.787 n/a 3.602 n/a n/a
TOTAL (EU 27) 4.414 62.328 45.464.992 139.451.165 722.361 4.616.182 2.426.106 2.367.639 20 (1) 14 (1)
(a) 2004 figures  (b) 2000 figures (1) :  Estimate
n/a :  Not applicable
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